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FEDERAL TAXATION: TAX CONSEQUENCES OF
DIVORCE PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS
IN RESOLVING a conflict in the Courts of Appeal and the Court of
Claims,' the Supreme Court held in United States v. Davis2 that a
husband realizes a taxable gain on a transfer of appreciated stock
to his former wife pursuant -to a divorce property settlement agree-
ment, to the extent that the fair market value of the stock at the
date of its transfer exceeds the husband's adjusted cost basis.
A voluntary property settlement and separation agreement was
executed in 1954 between the taxpayer and his wife.8  As a "di-
vision in the settlement of their property," the taxpayer agreed to
transfer to her 1000 shares of stock 4 In accordance with this agree-
ment, which was incorporated into the divorce decree,8 one-half of
the stock was delivered in 1955, the tax year involved. The Com-
missioner determined an income tax deficiency on the ground that
the husband realized a gain of $7,474.63, the difference between what
he paid for the shares and their market value at the date of the
transfer.8 After paying the asserted deficiency, and upon disallow-
ance of a claim for refund, the taxpayer sued in the Court of Claims
I Compare Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942) and Commis-
sioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), with Commissioner v. Marshman, 279
F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960) and Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961), rev'd,
370 U.S. 65 (1962).
2 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
3 The agreement recited that, "Mhe parties intend by this agreement to settle
their respective rights and obligations against and to one another by (1) making a
division of their property; (2) providing in lieu of alimony in the event of a decree of
divorce for the support and maintenance of the wife; (3) making an arrangement and
provision for the support and maintenance of Stephen; and (4) defining the rights of
custody, maintenance, support and education of their minor child." Brief for Ap-
pellant, p. 3.
'The wife agreed to accept "the division of property in full settlement and satis-
faction of any and all claims and rights against the husband whatsover ... which she
ever had, now had, or might have against the husband by reason of their relationship
as husband and wife or otherwise." Id. at 4.
"On January 5, 1955, the wife was granted a final decree of divorce from the
taxpayer by the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. The court's
decree approved the settlement of the parties and directed him to carry it out. Id. at 5.
0 The cost basis of the 500 shares of duPont stock was $74,775.37. This stock had
a fair market value at the date of the transfer, March 21, 1955, of $82,250, or an
increase in value over the cost basis of $7,474.63. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue assessed the tax deficiency on the basis of including in the taxpayer's gross
income a net long-term capital gain of one-half of $7,474.63, or $3,737.31. Davis v.
United States, 287 F.2d 168, 169 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
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to recover the alleged overpayment of taxes. This court overruled
the Commissioner and held that no taxable gain was realized on the
transfer of the appreciated property.7
The Supreme Court reversed,8 holding that the appropriate
occasion to tax any appreciation in the value of the stock transferred
pursuant to the divorce agreement was at the time the husband
transferred the shares to his wife, because this transfer amounted
to a taxable "exchange" of property for the release of an independ-
ent legal obligation.9 In determining that the tax consequences
7 Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961). The Court of Claims held
that although the taxpayer may have realized economic gain, he did not realize
taxable gain under the provision of § 1001 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The court reasoned that the statutory definition of "amount realized" calls for a
determination of "fair market value of the property ... received" and that there was
no adequate criteria for measuring the value of the marital rights released by the wife.
Id. at 174.
8 United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). The Supreme Court affirmed, how.
ever, the holding in Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961), that the pay.
ment by the husband of the wife's legal expenses for tax advice in connection with
the divorce property settlement agreement was not deductible.
9 370 U.S. at 68-71. The Court first decided that "there can be no doubt that
Congress, as evidenced by its inclusive definition of income subject to taxation, i.e.,
all income from whatever source derived, including ... gains derived from dealings
in property,' [INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 61 (a)] intended that the economic growth ol
this stock be taxed." Id. at 68. Therefore, the only problem confronting the Court
was when the appreciation in the value of the stock should be taxed.
The Court admitted that "the controlling statutory language, which provides that
gains from dealings in property are to be taxed upon 'sale or other disposition' [INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1001-02], is too general to include or exclude conclusively the
transaction presently in issue." Id. at 68-69. The Government argued, therefore, that
the transaction amounted to a "sale or exchange" in which property is received in
satisfaction of a legal obligation. Such a transfer is a taxable transaction-the debt
which is satisfied constituting the property received. Peninsula Properties Co., 47
B.T.A. 84 (1942). See 2 MEazNS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATiON § 11.21 n. 50 (rev. ed.
1961) [hereinafter cited as MERTENS]; Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the
Federal Income Tax: A Problem of Creeping Confusion, 14 TAx L. REv. 225, 234
(1959). The taxpayer contended, on the other hand, that the transaction more
closely resembled a gift or a division of community property. A transfer which
classifies as a gift is not a taxable event. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 102. See I MERTEN1
§ 7.10 (rev. ed. 1962). Also, where a specific asset of the community property if
divided equally, or where there is an equal division of the entire community property
no gain is taxable to either spouse. Commissioner v. Mills, 183 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.
1950) (equal division of specific asset); Osceola H. Davenport, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem,
856 (1953), Francis R. Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935) (equal division of the entire com-
munity property). However, if the division of the entire community property is un-
equal or if the division is equal, but one spouse gives his note or other obligation foi
all or part of the property set aside to him, then the transaction is treated as a "sale
or exchange." C. C. Rouse, 6 T.C. 908, aft'd, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947) (division
unequal); Jessie Lee Edwards, 22 T.C. 65 (1954) (division equal, but one spouse gave
note for part of his share). See Robert K. Stephens, 38 T.C. No. 39 (1962) (citing
Davis as authority); Brawerman, A Practical Approach to Tax Problems in Divorce
and Property Settlement Agreements, U. So. CAL. 1960 Tax INST. 753, 759-66. How.
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should not be delayed until a subsequent transfer by the wife, the
Court rejected the taxpayer's contention that this transfer qualified
as either a gift10 or a non-taxable division of property."
The only real point of conflict in the lower courts was resolved
by deciding that the husband's gain could be measured, and was
therefore taxable.'2  Stating that it would be more consistent with
taxing policies to make a rough approximation of the gain than to
ignore entirely the tax consequences, the Court first utilized an
assumption that the transfer was at "arm's length."'13 The Court
then went on to presume, absent evidence of some other value,14 that
the released marital rights were equal in value to the shares of stock
at the date of their transfer.' 5 It was recognized that this method
of valuation might seem unrealistic in the case of divorce property
settlements, because of the emotions, tensions, and practical necessi-
ties of the parties that must be resolved in the preliminary negotia-
tions.16 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that these difficulties,
ever, the Court, by a process of elimination, accepted the Government's contention,
finding it in line with the settled law in the lower courts. 370 U.S. at 71.
10 The Court summarily dismissed this idea in a footnote stating that "any sug-
gestion that the transaction in question was a gift is completely unrealistic." 370 U.S.
at 69 n.6. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see note 40 infra.
11 This contention was rejected on the ground that under the controlling Delaware
law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1531 (a) (1953), the wife's rights of succession and a
reasonable share more closely resemble a personal obligation of the husband and a
burden on his property than a property interest of the wife. 370 U.S. at 69-71.
See note 41 infra.
1"According to the Supreme Court, both Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d
27 (6th Cir. 1960) and Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961), while holding
the gain indeterminable, conceded that the transaction was otherwise a taxable event.
370 U.S. at 71. For a similar interpretation, see 109 U. PA. L. REV. 438, 439 n. 10
(1961).
18 370 U.S. at 72.
14 It has been suggested that this qualification in making the "equal values" assump-
tion implies that Davis has not precluded a taxpayer from showing and a court from
accepting a reasonable proof of the actual value of the property, i.e., relinquishment
of the marital rights of the wife, received by the husband in similar exchanges.
Walther, Can Advance Planning Avoid Harshness of Davis Rule on Appreciated
Property? 17 J. TAXATION 301, 302 (1962).
15 "[T]he values 'of two properties exchanged in an arm's length transaction are
either equal in fact, or are presumed to be equal.'" 370 U.S. at 72, quoting from Phila-
delphia Amusement Co. v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 166, 126 F. Supp. 184 (1954).
Accord, United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960); International
Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943). See also 10 MERTENS
§ 59.28 (Supp. 1962); Greenbaum, The Basis of Property Shall Be the Cost of Such
Property: How is Cost Defined? 3 TAX L. Rav. 351, 370 (1948).
"6 The difficulty in a divorce situation is that the benefit accruing to the husband
does not arise in a commercial transaction where the profit motive is compelling.
Compare cases cited note 15 supra. Rather the benefit is received in a personal
transaction where economic consequences are frequently secondary considerations.
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while making an exact valuation impossible, did not preclude an
approximation of the gain.17
The Davis decision has apparently settled the time for taxing
and the method of measuring any gain realized on the transfer of
appreciated property pursuant to a divorce property settlement
agreement. The practitioner can now be reasonably certain of the
Court's treatment of these two problems. As a result, he will be
better able to effectuate his client's objectives in divorce negotiations.
In bringing this much needed predictability to a complex area
of tax law, however, the Court indulged in some analytically weak
reasoning which may lead to an inequitable and inconsistent tax
consequence. If the Court can assume "that the parties acted at
arm's length and that they judged the marital rights to be equal
in value to the property for which they were exchanged,"'18 then
the market value of the stock at the date of the agreement rather
than its market value at the date of the transfer should have been
used in measuring the husband's gain. It is unrealistic to expect
the parties to know over four months in advance what the market
value of the stock would be at the date of the transfer.")
Comment, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rlv. 593, 596 (1961). See Commissioner v. Marshman, 279
F.2d 27, 32 (6th Cir. 1960); Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168, 174 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
But see Comment, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 440 (1961).
'1 One reason the Court gave for holding that the value of the released marital
rights was ascertainable was that it eliminated the problem of determining the wife's
basis for the property received, "for the same calculation that determines the amount
received by the husband fixes the amount given up by the wife, and this figure, i.e.,
the market value of the property transferred by the husband, will be taken by her as
her tax basis for the property received." 370 U.S. at 73.
This rationale is questionable because, as the Government admitted, the collection
of the tax will be less certain if the property settlement, rather than the wife's ultimate
disposition of the property, is deemed the taxable event. Both the husband's gain
and the wife's basis would theoretically be measured by the fair market value of the
property transferred by the husband at the date of its transfer. However, in cases
where it would be difficult to determine the fair market value, e.g., where stock
transferred is not listed on a stock exchange, it can be expected that the husband will
claim a low valuation of the property transferred. It can also be expected that
the wife, perhaps many years later when she disposes of the property, will claim a high
valuation of the property. Brief for Appellant, p. 26.
For a discussion of the various problems connected with the tax consequences of the
wife in the Davis situation, see Comment, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 593, 600-04 (1961).
18 370 U.S. at 72.
19 The agreement was executed by the parties on November 4, 1954. The transfer
did not take place until March 21, 1955. The Court's use of the market value of the
stock at the date of the transfer seems especially unfair in that the husband would
have realized no gain on the actual transfer to the wife if the market value of the
stock at the date of the agreement had been used. At that date, the market value of
the stock was $145.63 per share or $72,815 for 500 shares. Since the cost basis for the
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There are two strictly technical considerations which support
the Court's utilization of the market value of the stock at the
transfer date in determinining the husband's gain. First, there was
a provision in the agreement that the wife was not to release her
marital rights until the transfer by the husband,20 a provision which
negates the contention that the husband's consideration for the
transfer was received at the time of the agreement.2' Secondly, the
Internal Revenue Code provides that the net gain is to be measured
by subtracting the adjusted basis from the amount "realized."22
Such a determination would apparently require using the market
value of the stock at the date of the transfer.23
The interaction of the Davis decision with Section 267 of the
Internal Revenue Code produces an apparent inconsistency and
may also lead to another inequitable and anomalous taxing result.
Section 267 disallows deductions with respect to losses from sales or
exchanges of property between "spouses" on the assumption that
such transactions are not at arm's length.24  Yet, under the Davis
rule, a taxable gain will be realized when appreciated property is
transferred by assuming just the opposite.
A close analysis reveals an explanation for the rejection of the
arm's length assumption in a situation governed by Section 267.
This section of the Code is based on the theory that transfers of
depreciated property between "spouses" are not induced by motives
shares was $149.55 per share or $74,775 for 500 shares, the taxpayer would have
suffered a loss of approximately $2000 if the agreement date value had been used.
Brief for Appellee, pp. 21-22.
20 Brief for Appellant, p. 4.
21 Brief for Appellee, pp. 21-22. It can be argued, however, that since the agree.
ment was executory at the date of the agreement, the wife's release of her marital
rights did not occur until 1956 when Mr. Davis made the second of two installment
deliveries of stock. Id. at 22.
22 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001 (a).
23 The "amount realized" is defined in § 1001 (b) of the 1954 Code as "the sum of
any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money)
received." Since the wife was not to release her marital rights until the transfer
of the stock by the husband, the measurement of the fair market value of the property
"received" from the transfer would require using the market value of the stock at the
date of the transfer. It was not until this time that the husband actually received
anything in the nature of property.
Note that Davis, in effect, replaced the word "received" in § 1001 (b) with the
word "transferred." However, the measurement of the fair market value of the
property "transferred" apparently still requires using the market value of the stock
at the date of its transfer.
24See Seaman v. United States, 156 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1946); Joseph C. Skinner, 47
B.T.A. 624 (1942), aff'd per curiam, 138 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1943); Kutz, Transactions
Between Related Taxpayers, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAx 69 (1955).
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of self-interest in the pursuit of financial profit, but are prompted
solely by a desire to establish deductible losses.25 The same motiva-
tion obviously does not exist in a transfer of appreciated property.
However, as the Court acknowledged, there are other motivations
present, when the transfer occurs in contemplation of a divorce,
which weaken the validity of this assumption."0 In such a situation,
one party is often willing to make a substantial lump sum payment
as an inducement for the other's co-operation in the negotiations,
and therefore the value of the property transferred is likely to
represent more than just the value of the wife's marital rights in
the husband's property.27 Thus it seems that the arm's length
assumption was, in effect, a device of administrative expediency-
a way to make a "taxable event" taxable-rather than a way to accord
with the realities of a divorce property settlement.
Notwithstanding the explanation for the inconsistent use of
the arm's length assumption in Section 267 and the Davis case,
there still remains the anomalous and inequitable result that the
husband may be denied any tax benefit from a loss incurred in trans-
ferring depreciated property for the release of the wife's marital
rights, while a taxable gain will be realized when appreciated
property is transferred 28 This anomaly is speculative, however,
because there is no authority to the effect that Section 267 will apply
in the Davis situation.29
In view of this uncertainty, the safest course for the husband, if
a transfer of appreciated property is contemplated, would be to sell
2' See H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1935); S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 27 (1936). Congress sought to put an end to the right of taxpayers to choose
by intrafamily and other devices the time for realizing tax losses on investments,
which for most practical purposes, are continued uninterrupted. McWilliams v. Com-
missioner, 331 U.S. 694, 700 (1947).
Note that §267 of the 1954 Code is not limited to sales or exchanges which are
motivated by tax avoidance, but now embraces all transfers between the persons
specifically listed in the statute. See 5 MERTENS § 28.49 (rev. ed. 1956).
20 370 U.S. at 72.
:T See Comment, 8 U.C.LA.L. REv. 593, 595 (1961); Walther, supra note 14, at 302.
28 See Taylor & Schwartz, Tax Aspects of Marital Property Agreements, 7 TAx L.
REv. 19, 30-31 (1951); Walther, supra note 14, at 301.
29 If the relationship of the parties is determined at the agreement date, then § 267
would prevent the husband from claiming any tax benefit on a transfer of depreciated
property, for at that date, the parties were undoubtedly still "spouses." See BAYLY,
TAx MANUAL FOR DIVORCE AND SEPARATION 243 (1953); RicE, FAMILY TAX PLANNING
431-32 (1960). If, however, the relationship of the two parties is determined at the
date of the transfer, then § 267 would not apply unless two persons legally separated
under a decree of divorce are still "spouses" for purposes of this section.
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the property on the open market and then distribute the net pro-
ceeds to his wife. In this way, he should be able to avoid the applica-
tion of Section 267 altogether. Furthermore, since it appears that
the date of the transfer is the technically correct date for determining
the market value of the transferred property, it is suggested that
either the actual transfer be made to the wife at the time of the
agreement or that the husband agree to transfer a dollar-value rather
than a specified amount of property, thereby avoiding any unfore-
seeable gain.
All of the adverse tax consequences which result from the appli-
cation of the Davis holding totransfer of appreciated property may
be avoided by the husband's creation of a trust, as described in
Revenue Ruling 57-506,30 which operates as a conduit for the trans-
mission of the payments to the wife for the release of her marital
rights.3 1 To successfully establish this so-called "conduit" trust,
the taxpayer must be certain that the trust-creating instrument
neither discharges the husband's obligation to pay for the release of
the wife's marital rights at the date of its execution 32 nor provides
a method for terminating this obligation at some subsequent date
before the wife's death or remarriage.3 3 In keeping with its char-
acter as a mere conduit by which payments are made to the wife,
the husband must have a continuing obligation to make these pay-
ments.3 4 This requirement is satisfied if the husband guarantees in
the trust instrument that his former wife will receive a specified
income at each payment period. 35
A conduit trust satisfying all of the requirements could be set
up in the following fashion:3 6 a husband transfers property to an
irrevocable trust with the provision that a specified portion of the
income will be paid to the wife for life or until her remarriage with
the excess income and the corpus irrevocably dedicated to charitable
purposes. If the trust income is ever insufficient to make the pay-
30 Rev. Rul. 506, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 65.
"1 See Walther, supra note 14, at 303-04, for a discussion of the "conduit" trust and
its value as a means of avoiding the income tax consequences of the Davis decision.
32 Rev. Rul. 506, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 65.
- Rev. Rul. 507, 1957-2 Cum. Bum- 511. See also Rev. Rul. 47, 1959-1 CuM. BuLL.
198.
34 Rev. Rul. 506, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 65.
3r Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935); Weir v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 996 (3d
Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940). See Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1037, 1043
(1948).
80 See Rev. Rul. 506, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 65.
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ments, the husband is obligated to make up the deficit from his own
income.
The taxpayer must be warned, however, that even though the
life interest of the wife satisfies the requirements for the "conduit"
trust, it is still possible that some gain may be taxed to him on
the remainder interest. This could happen because these two
interests in the trust are treated separately for taxing purposes.32
Therefore, if the entire transfer is to escape income tax consequences,
the remainder interest must also satisfy no legal obligation of the
husband, as is the case when the remainder beneficiary is a charity.
Besides avoiding the tax consequences of the Davis decision, the
"conduit" trust has the advantages found in the alimony trust,
and therefore is an attractive device for transferring property in
connection with divorce settlement agreements.38 Thus, if the Davis
37 Cf. Rev. Rul. 507, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 511, in which the wife's life interest and
the remainder interest were treated separately in determining the taxable gain realized
by the husband. The appreciation in the value of the property transferred to the
trust which was attributable to the wife's life estate was taxed to the husband
because he could terminate his obligation before the wife's death or remarriage by
transferring a specified sum to the trust. However, no gain was attributed to the
remainder interest which was dedicated for educational purposes because such a
transfer is exempt from the income tax. The Internal Revenue Service stated that "in
arriving at the taxable gain, the excess of the fair market value of the property on
the date of the transfer to the trust over the grantor's basis thereof should be reduced
by the present value of the remainder interest. Thus if property valued at $20,000
with a basis of $10,000 is transferred to the trust, and at the time of the transfer the
value of the life interest is 50 per cent, then the taxpayer will realize a taxable gain
in an amount equal to 50 per cent of the appreciation, or $5,000." Id. at 512-13.
There seems to be no reason to expect a different treatment where the wife's life
interest satisfies the requirements of a "conduit" trust, and the remainder interest it
set up to discharge a money obligation of the husband. No gain will be attributed to
the wife's interest. See Rev. Rul. 506, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 65. However, the apprecia.
tion in the value of the property attributable to the remainder interest should be taxed
since it satisfies a legal obligation. See Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986, 988 (3d
Cir. 1941). It would seem that in such a case the excess of the fair market value of the
property at the date of the transfer over the taxpayer's basis would only be reduced
by the present value of the wife's life estate, and the taxpayer would realize a taxable
gain on the transfer of that part of the property attributable to the remainder interest.
8 In the first place, payments to the wife by the trust otherwise qualifying under
§ 71 of the 1954 Code are included in her gross income and not in the husband's.
Secondly, if the remainder interest is to go to a charity, the husband will receive
a charitable deduction in the year of the transfer. INT. REV. CoDE or 1954, § 170.
Also, where a charity is the remainder beneficiary, the executor of the husband's estate
will probably be able to claim an estate tax deduction. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§2005; Rev. Rul. 275, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 295.
One possible disadvantage is that the use of the "conduit" trust may result in the
inclusion of the corpus in the husband's estate. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036;
Estate of Robert Manning McKeon, 25 T.C. 697 (1956). Another possible disadvantage
is the requirement that the husband must guarantee the payment of a specified income
[Vol. 1963: sot
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decision is to be preserved, legislative enactment may be required
to close this "loophole."
It is submitted, however, that any legislative consideration could
be better aimed at formulating a new approach in dealing with
transfers in connection with divorce property settlement agreements.
The various adverse tax consequences of the Davis decision expose
the inadequacy and inequity of existing tax provisions in handling
such transfers. Accordingly, it is suggested that the Internal Rev-
enue Code be amended so that the transfer is treated as either a
gift39 or a non-taxable division of property ° for income tax purposes.
An even better solution would be the addition of a specific provision
in the Code which would handle such transfer in the following
manner: 41 (1) any property received in a marital settlement is
excluded from gross income; (2) no gain or loss is realized upon the
transfer of property whether for support, dower, or even to induce
the divorce; (3) the transferee is given the transferor's basis in the
property. In any event, it is recommended that the taxing policies
relating to transfers in connection with divorce property settlement
agreements be submitted to an extensive analysis, since the Davis
decision leaves much to be desired.
to the wife. This can be minimized by an initial careful selection of the trust corpus.
See Walther, supra note 14, at 303.
$11 This approach would seem acceptable since the government admitted that, "not-
withstanding the seeming anomaly of treating as a 'gift' a transfer made under legal
compulsion-i.e., to satisfy a legal obligation-we acknowledge that as an original
matter, that might well have been the most satisfactory treatment of such marital
transfers." Brief for Appellant, pp. 29-30. See Comment, 1959 DUKE L.J. 616, ad-
vocating such a treatment of marital transfers for income tax purposes.
40 This approach likewise seems acceptable since the Court in the Davis case stated
that, "this is not to say that it would be completely illogical to consider the shearing
off of the wife's rights in her husband's property as a division of property .... " 370
U.S. at 70. However, it should be noted that in the Davis case, even if the Court
had decided to use community property principles, the transfer would have probably
still been taxable. See Comment, 42 B.U.L. REv. 547, 550 (1962) and note 9 supra.
"This solution is the same as that proposed by the American Law Institute in
1954. ALI Fm.. INCOME TAX STAT. § X257 (Feb. 1954 Draft). It would tend to place
the tax burden on the wife, but at a time when she is in a position to pay the tax.
By deferring the collection of the capital gains tax on the appreciation in value of the
property until such time as the wife sells the property, the tax will be imposed at
a time when the wife has the cash proceeds from the sale. In any case, such a
method would prevent the taxing of the husband at the very moment when he is
seriously depleting his estate and receiving in return the release of the wife's marital
rights which is worth nothing to anyone except himself.
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